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... if suspicion at large should be a ground of 
search, ... whose house would be safe? 
Lord Camden CJ 
Entick v Carrington 
( 1765) 19 St Tr 1029, 1073-1074. 
What is to be said of the Anton Piller procedure 
which, on a regular and institutionalised basis, is 
depriving citizens of their property and closing 
down their businesses by orders made ex parte, on 
applications of which they know nothing and at which 
they cannot be heard, by orders which they are 
forced, on pain of committal, to obey, even if 
wrongly made? 
Scott J 
Columbia Picture Industries Jncv Robinson 
[1987] Ch 38, 74. 

INTRODUCTION 
During the mid-seventies technological and societal changes 
led to courts in England developing a new range of orders and 
injunctions to assist plaintiffs who otherwise would have their 
just claims frustrated. These new developments included the 
Norwich Pharmacal order requiring third parties to reveal the 
identities of tortfeasors;1 the M areva injunction restraining 
defendants from removing money outside jurisdiction;
2 reform of the 
threshold requirement for interlocutory injunctions
3 and the Anton 
Piller order authorising plaintiffs to enter defendants' premises 
to search for and seize material evidence.
4 These developments 
were made pursuant to a liberal interpretation of the Rules of the
 
Supreme Court or, if necessary, the inherent jurisdiction of the 
court. 
In the case of the Anton Piller order, the need for a new 
development arose out of technological developments. enabling la
rge-
scale copying of audio and video recordings to be done very 
cheaply. Piracy of these recordings soon become widespread, 
costing record and film companies enormous amounts in lost reve
nue. 
1N orwich Pharmacal Co v Customs and Excise Commissioners [
1974] 
AC 133. 
2M areva Compania Na viera SA v / nternat iunal Bulkcarriers SA
 
[1975] 2 Lloyd's Rep 509. 
3American Cyanamid Cu v Eth icon Ltd [1975] AC 396. 
4 Antun Piller KG v Manufacturing Processes Ltd [1976] Ch 55. 
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The existing remedies for copyright infringement were inadequate to 
deal with this problem mainly because of evidential difficulties. 
The pirate copies were generally sold through small corner shops, 
hotels etc. It was very difficult to trace where the pirate copies 
were actually being made and distributed from. There was little 
point in suing individual shopkeepers as each one was responsible 
for very little damage to the copyright holder. It was the 
cumulative effect of many infringements that caused so much damage. 
It was beyond the resources of the copyright holders to sue every 
infringing shopkeeper, and the trivial criminal penalties for 
copyright infringement,5 and its essentially 'private' nature, 
meant the police would not commit any resources to this area. 
This situation was made worse by many dishonest defendants 
who, once they were given notice of an action against them, would 
destroy or dispose of any further evidence. The consequence of 
this was that the record and film companies were left effectively 
powerless while their profits slumped due to the illegal activities 
of the pirates. Their copyright in recordings and their rights to 
its protection lost much of their value. 
To rectify this situation, record and film companies began 
seeking a new sort of order from the courts. It was essentially an 
5Copyright Act 1962, s28(3): the maximum penalty is a fine of 
$1000. See also Copyright Act 1956 (UK), s21. 
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interlocutory order for discovery, obtained ex part e, combined with 
a requirement that the defendant permit the plaintiff's solicitor 
to enter and inspect their premises for any infringing copies and 
material evidence which could then be removed. This order could be 
served on the defendant at the same time as the writ so that he or 
she had no opportunity to dispose of any evidence. 
This order gives some protection to the copyright holder's 
rights but at the expense of the defendant's right to privacy. It 
has proved to be incredibly useful to record and film companies in 
countering the activities of pirates. However, as a purely 
judicial development it does suffer from the disadvantages of 
judicial lawmaking, such as development on an ad h u c basis, and it 
also has a doubtful constitutional basis. Subsequent development 
has expanded the terms of the order as well as the circumstances in 
which it will be granted. This expansion has led to some loose 
applications of the originally strict criteria for granting the 
orders and to their abuse by some plaintiffs. 
This paper outlines the origins and subsequent development of 
the Anton Pill er order and examines the jurisdiction utilised by 
the courts to grant them. It then examines the contents of an 
3 
Anton Piller order and the existing safeguards for defendants. It 
concludes with suggestions for reform, preferably made by Parlia-
ment, of the Anton Piller order that would preserve its beneficial 
and useful role but prevent any further abuse. 
4 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE ANTON PILLER ORDER
 
Anton Piller orders began to be granted in 1974.
6 The first 
reported instance of such an order being given was E. M. I. Ltd
 v 
Pandit.
7 In this case the plaintiffs owned the copyright in 
recordings of Indian music and claimed that the defendant w
as both 
infringing this copyright and passing-off. They obtained an
 
injunction against the defendant restraining him from furth
er 
infringement and passing-off as well as an order that the de
fendant 
file an affidavit giving the names and addresses of his suppl
iers 
of the infringing material and of any customers and to attac
h 
copies of any relevant documents. The defendant filed an a
ffidavit 
described by Templeman J as 'a pack of lies'.
8 The plaintiffs 
produced evidence establishing the untruth of the affidavit,
 the 
forgery of a letter attached to it and that the defendant had
 'been 
engaged in an expens.ive , extensive and quite deliberate cou
rse of 
dealing in infringement of the plaintiffs ' copyright ' .
9 Templeman 
J granted an ex parte order that the defendant permit the plaintif
f 
to enter his premises for the inspection and photographing 
of 
evidence and the removal of any infringing copies. 
6A & M Records Inc v Aram Darakdjian (unreported, 21 Ma
y 1974, 
Foster J); E.M. I. Ltd v K hazan (unreported, 3 July 1974, 
Foster J); Pall Europe Ltd v Mi c rof i l t rex Ltd (unreported, 2
8 
October 1974, Goff J), order only reported at [1976] RPC 326. 
7 [1975] 1 WLR 302. 
8Above n7, 304. 
9Above n7, 304. 
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Templeman J acknowledged that thi s was ' ... an unusual order, 
which will only be made in unusual circumstances.'
10 The order was 
justified in this case because if the order was not made and 
the 
plaintiffs followed the normal procedure of providing notic
e et c, 
' ... then the horse will rapidly leave the stable, ... and the 
plaintiffs will be effectively debarred from obtaining furthe
r 
relief.'
11 The order was necessary to prevent the administration 
of justice being frustrated. However, the order should be li
mited 
l h 
• 12 
to sue 1 cases w ere 1t was necessary: 
I think it right to stress that, in my judgrnent, the 
kind of order which is sought now can only be 
justified by a very strong case on the evidence and 
can only be justified where the circumstances are 
exce.J?tional to this extent, that it plainly appears 
that Justice requires the intervention of the court 
in the manner which is sought and without notice, 
otherwise the plaintiffs may be substantially depri-
ved of a remedy. 
This order was approved by the Court of Appeal in Anton Pil
ler 
KG v M anuf act uring Processes Ltd,
13 from which it takes its name. 
In this case the plaintiffs were German manufacturers of ele
ctrical 
components. The defendant company was the plaintiffs ' Br
itish 
agent for the supply of its components. A s agent it had been
 
provided with confidential information about the plaintiffs '
 corn po-
10Above n7, 303. 
11 Above n7, 304. 
12Above n7, 307. 
13Above n4. 
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nents as well as drawings. The plaintiffs discovered through 
two 
'defectors' working for the defendant that it was in communi
cation 
with two other German companies. The defendant was to pr
ovide 
these companies with information about the plaintiffs' comp
onents 
so they could produce similar ones. The defectors' evidence
 was 
supported by documents from the German companies showin
g that the 
defendant had sent them drawings of the plaintiffs' compone
nts and 
showing an intention to copy them. The plaintiffs were conc
erned 
especially as they were about to produce a new component. 
The plaintiffs applied ex parte for an order that they be 
permitted to enter the defendant's premises to inspect docum
ents 
and remove them or copies of them. Brightman J initially refuse
d 
to grant the order:
14 
I do not think that such an order ought to be 
granted except in an extreme case where the ends of 
justice are almost certain to be frustrated if the 
order is not made. That is not, in my opinion, this 
present case .... It is conceivable, but it is not 
inevitable, that the refusal to make such an order 
in a particular case will lead to the suppression of 
evidence or the misuse of documentary material. 
Save in an extreme case I think that that risk must 
be accepted in civil matters. 
The plaintiffs appealed and the Court of Appeal unanimousl
y 
allowed the appeal and granted the order, confirming the jur
isdic-
14 [1976] RPC 719, 721-722. 
7 
tion to grant these orders. Lord Denning MR stated:
15 
It seems to me that such an order can be made by a 
judge ex parte, but it should only be made where it 
is essential that the plaintiff should have inspec-
tion so that justice can be done between the 
parties: and when, if the defendant were forewarned, 
there is a grave danger that vital evidence will be 
destroyed, that papers will be burnt or lost or 
hidden, or taken beyond the jurisdiction, and so the 
ends of justice be defeated: and when the inspection 
would do no real harm to the defendant or his case. 
Interestingly, almost simultaneously, the New Zealand Court of 
Appeal was confirming a similar jurisdiction. In Donselaar v 
M osen
16 O'Regan J had made an ex parte order authorising the 
plaintiff or the sheriff to enter the defendants' premises to 
obtain and hold books of account that were the only records of wor
k 
done by the plaintiff for the defendants. His Honour made the 
order under Rule 478 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
17 The 
defendants appealed. The Court of Appeal agreed that the order 
could not have been made under Rule 478, but instead held that it 
15 Above n4, 61. 
16 (1976] 2 NZLR 191. 
11 R 478 provided that: 
The Court ... may make an order for the detention, 
preservation, or inspection of any property which is 
the subject of the action ... , and ... may authorise any 
persons or persons to enter upon or into any land or 
building in the possession of any party to su 
action, ... 
This power is now contained in RR 322 and 331 of the High 
Court Rules. 
8 
was justified under the inherent jurisdiction of the court. 
McCarthy P said:
18 
... the court had an inherent jurisdiction to make an 
appropriate order to preserve eviden tiary material 
in circumstances such as pertained here if that were 
necessary in the interests of justice. 
Although the recent English cases were cited to the court
, they 
were not relied on by the Court of Appeal in confirming t
his 
jurisdiction.
19 However, this jurisdiction is now treated as part 
of the Anton Piller jurisdiction.
20 
18Above n16, 192. 
19See CF Finlayson "Instant Discovery - The Anton Piller O
rder" 
LLM Research Paper, Victoria University of Wellington, 1983, 
26-27. 
20Busbyv Thorn EM I Video Programmes Ltd (1984] 1 NZL 
461,466 
per Cooke J. 
9 
THE JURISDICTION 
It has always been recognised that Anton Piller orders were 
exercised at the outer limits of the courts' powers. In Anton 
Piller, Ormrod LJ stated:
2 1 
The proposed order is at the extremity of this 
court's powers. Such orders, therefore , will rarely 
be made, and only when there is no alternative way 
of ensuring that justice is done to the applicant. 
The justification for such a sweeping order is that it is essential 
to prevent justice being defeated through a deserving plaintiff 
being denied a remedy because vital evidence has been destroyed. 
Therefore, it falls within the inherent jurisdiction of the court 
to make orders necessary to administer the law.
22 This is a 
procedural power of the court:
23 
The inherent jurisdiction of the court is exerci-
sable as part of the process of the administration 
of justice. It is part of procedural law, both 
civil and criminal, and not of substantive law; it 
is invoked in relation to the process of litigation. 
This jurisdiction is not wide enough to permit the court to make 
any order necessary to do justice between the parties but is 
limited to procedural matters. In this case it allows the court to 
21Above n4, 61. 
22In New Zealand: Judicature Act 1908, s16. 
231 H Jacob "The Inherent Jurisdiction of the Court", (1970) 23 
CLP 23, 24. 
10 
waive the normal requirement of notice before an order will be made 
to preserve evidence.
24 It may be exercised in any case and at any 
stage of proceedings, or even ' .. .in contemplation of proceedings 
... where rights or properties or remedies claimed by the plaintiff 
are in jeopardy.'
25 
Clearly, the preservation of evidence is essential for the 
administration of the law, and orders relating to this can be 
justified under the court's inherent jurisdiction in cases not 
explicitly covered by the High Court Rules. However, there are 
limits to the orders which the court could make. It has been 
established since Entick v Carrington
26 that no body except 
Parliament can authorise search warrants , ie authorise the forcible 
entry and search of another ' s property. Therefore , judges have 
always been enthusiastic to emphasise that Anton Piller orders are 
not search warrants and do not permit the use off orce to gain 
27 entry: 
... no court in this land has any power to issue a 
search warrant to enter a man ' s house ... But the 
order sought in this case is not a search war-
rant.. . .It only authorises entry and inspection by 
the permission of the defendants. The plaintiffs 
24A J Bekhor & Co Ltd v Bi! ton (1981] QB 923, 942-943 per Ackner 
LJ. 
25 Ra n k Film Dis t rib u t ors L t d v V id e o In Ju r m a t i o n C en t re [ 19 8 2] 
AC 380,417 per Templeman LJ. 
26( 176 5 ) 19 St T r 10 2 9. 
27Above n4, 60 per Lord Denning MR. See also above n7, 305 per 
Templeman J. 
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must get the defendants' permission. But it does do 
this: It brings pressure on the defendants to give 
permission. It does more. It actually orders them 
to give permission - with, I suppose, the result 
that if they do not give permission, they are guilty 
of contempt of court. 
Therefore, the Anton Piller order is an order acting in personam on 
the defendant directing him or her to allow entry onto his or her 
property for certain purposes. This direction is supported by the 
threat of proceedings for contempt of court. 
This may seem to be ' ... a search warrant in disguise.'
28 
However, it was partly justified by reference to East India Coy v 
Kynaston.
29 In that case Kynaston was entitled to tithes according 
to the value of some of the East India Company's warehouses. The 
House of Lords ordered the East India Company to allow Kynaston to 
enter their warehouses to value them. In answering the East India 
Company's objection that the court had no power to compel them to 
permit Kynaston to enter, Lord Redesdale said:
30 
If it be true that [the Court] has no such power, 
there are many cases in which there must be a total 
defect of justice .... The arguments urged for the 
Appellants at the Bar are founded upon the supposi-
tion, that the Court has directed a forcible inspec-
tion. This is an erroneous view of the case. The 
28Above n4, 60 per Lord Denning MR. 
29 United Company of Merchants of Engl and, Trading to the East 
Indiesv Kynaston (1821) 3 Bli 153 (HL). 
30Above n29, 162-163. 
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order is to permit; and if the East India Company 
should refuse to permit inspection, they will be 
guilty of a contempt of the Court. 
Although in Kynaston the order was made inter part es and after the 
substantive trial, there was authority for making similar search 
d . I 31 d 
32 H . 
or ers at an rnter ocutory stage an ex parte. owever, 111 
these cases the object of each search was far more specific than an 
Anton Pill er search; for example: the valuing of warehouses,
33 the 
identification of certain pieces of timber
34 and so on. They 
cannot be regarded as strong authority for the wide-ranging Anton 
Piller jurisdiction claimed by courts.
35 
... it is surprising that a specific jurisdiction 
said to arise out of necessity can be utili sed more 
than 150 years later in the creation of an all-
embracing general jurisdiction empowering the court 
in interlocutory proceedings to order that a party 
"do permit" anything to be done to him - the only 
vague limitation being that the Court view it as 
"necessary in the interests of justice." 
This was recognised to a certain extent by Lord Denning MR in 
Anton Pill er who, unlike Templeman Jin E. M. I. Ltd v Pandit, did 
not rely primarily on precedent authority, but rather on the 
principle that such orders are nece ssary for the administration of 
31 Earl of Lonsdalev Curwen (1799) 3 Bli 168. 
32 Hennessy v Bohmann, Osborne & Co [1877] WN 14; Morris v Ho well 
(1888) 22 LRir 77. 
33 East India Coyv Kynaston above 1129. 
34M orris v Ho well above n32. 
35 M Dockray "Liberty to Rummage - A Search Warrant in Civil 
Proceedings?" [1977) PL 369,376. 
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justice. Kynaston was used as an example of a general jurisdiction 
to make orders ordering the defendant to allow the plaintiff to 
enter his or her property. In certain cases it will be necessary 
to grant these orders ex parte and at an interlocutory stage. 
The jurisdiction to grant Anton Piller orders was fin ally 
confirmed by the House of Lords in Runk Film Distributors Ltdv 
Video information Centre, Lord Wilberforce calling them ' ... an 
illustration of the adaptability of equitable remedies to new 
situations.'36 
36Above n25, 439. 
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THE EXPANSION OF THE ANT ON PILLER ORDER 
The Anton Piller order was initially confined to the removal 
of infringing copies and the removal or copying of vital evidence 
relating to the defendant's infringement. However, it was quickly 
extended to also require the defendant to give up to the plaintiff 
the names and addresses of the suppliers of the infringing copies, 
and of any customers, as well as the relevant documents.
37 
Later it was further extended to restrain the defendant from 
disclosing the subject matter of the plaintiff's action to anyone 
else. 3
8 This was to prevent defendants warning their suppliers and 
so preserving the plaintiff's element of surprise. 
In Yousif v S alama,
39 an Anton Piller order was granted in a 
case involving a straightforward business dispute which did not 
involve piracy, passing-off or any form of intellectual property. 
The plaintiff was suing the first defendant for commission which he 
alleged was owed to him under an agreement between them. Under the 
agreement the plaintiff was to procure certain business to be 
placed with the second defendant, a company controlled by the first 
defendant. Any commission received by the company due to this 
business was to be shared with the plaintiff. The company had 
37 £.M.J. Ltdv Sarwar [1977] FSR 146 (CA). 
38 C hanel Ltd v 3 Pears Whole.sale Cash and Carry Co [1979) FSR 
393. 
39 [1980) 1 WLR 1540. 
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provided the plaintiff with a statement of account for some of the 
commission but had not paid him. The plaintiff went with the first 
defendant to the company's office. There he was shown two files 
and a desk diary which showed sums owing to him. To recover the 
outstanding sums the plaintiff brought proceedings and served a 
writ on the defendants. He was concerned about the two files and 
the desk diary and feared that the first defendant would Jestroy 
them. Therefore, he applied for an Anton Piller order to enter the 
company's office and inspect them. The plaintiff provided evidence 
that the first defendant had forged a signature on the back of a 
cheque payable to the plaintiff so that it became payable to the 
company. 
Robert Goff J refused to grant the order but the Court of 
Appeal reversed this decision. Lord Denning MR
40 granted the order 
because there was ' ... evidence (if it is accepted) which shows the 
first defendant to be untrustworthy'
41 and although the files and 
desk diary were not the subject matter of the case, ' ... they are 
the best possible evidence to prove the plaintiff's case.'
42 The 
40Brightman LJ concurring. 
41 Above 1139, 1542. 
42Above n39, 1542. 
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plaintiff had a 'legitimate' and 'genuine' fear that the defendant 
would destroy the documents before a substantive trial. Further-
43 
more: 
It can do no harm to the first defendant at all. If 
he is honest, he will produce the documents in any 
case. If he is dishonest, that is all the more 
reason why the order be made. 
Donaldson LJ dissented on the ground that ' ... evidence of an 
intention to destroy [was] flimsy in the extreme.'
44 Furthermore, 
even if the two files and the desk diary were destroyed, the 
plaintiff would still have sufficient evidence to prove his claim. 
Therefore, justice would not be defeated if the order was not 
granted and this case was not sufficiently exceptional to justify 
exercising this 'Draconian power'.
45 Donaldson LJ went on to 
say: 46 
I have considered, of course, whether, as was 
suggested in argument, it can rightly be said that 
no harm is done to an honest man by taking discovery 
from him when eventually he would have been ordered 
to give it. I think that great harm is done. The 
people of this country are entitled not to have 
their privacy and their property invaded by a court 
order except in very exceptional circumstances. 
The emphasis on the exceptional circumstances required did not 
43Above n39, 1542; per Lord Denning MR. 
44Above n39, 1543. 
45 Above n39, 1544. 
46Above n39, 1544. 
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prevent the courts granting them frequently, and in a wide range of 
cases extending beyond the area of intellectual property. In E.x 
parte Island Records Ltd Lord Denning MR said:
47 
So useful are these orders that they are now in 
daily use - not only in cases of infringement of 
copyright, but also in passing-off cases, and other 
cases. 
Anton Piller orders have been granted in matrimonial property 
cases,48 cases involving disputed business debts,
49 cases involving 
the enforcement of judgment debts
50 and contempt of court cases.
51 
The frequency of Anton Piller orders is not seen as inconsistent 
with their 'exceptional' nature. They have subsequently been 
adopted in New Zealand
52 and Australia,
53 partially adopted in 
Canada54 and adopted and then rejected in South Africa.
55 
47 [1978] Ch 122, 133. 
48Emanuelv Emanuel [1982] 1 WLR 669. 
49 Y ousif v Salama above n39; Johnson v L & A Phil ateli cs Ltd 
[1981] FSR 286. 
50DistributoriAutomatici Italia SpAv Holford General Trading 
Co Ltd (1985] 1 WLR 1066. 
51 Garvin v Do mus Publishing Ltd [1989] Ch 335. 
52 Fine Art Product ions Ltd v Gray [1980] FSR 323; Busby v Thorn 
EM IV idea Programmes Ltd above n20. 
53 E.M. I. ( Australia) Ltd v Bay Imports Pty Ltd [1980] FSR 328 
(Sup Ct of NSW - Eq D) and Note [1980] FSR 333; Polygram 
Records Pty Ltdv Mon ash Records (Ausralia) Pty Ltd (1985) 6 
IPR 423 (Fed Ct of Aus). 
54See J Berryman "Anton Piller Orders: A Canadian Common Law 
Approach" (1984) 34 Univ of Toronto LJ 1. 
55See GA Coetzee "Anton Piller-Type Orders in South African 
Law" (1985) 102 SALJ 634. 
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THE REQUIREMENTS FOR AN ANTON PILLER ORDER 
In Anton Piller Ormrod LJ stated the requirements to give an 
Anton Piller order:
56 
First, there must be an extremely strong prima facie 
case. Secondly, the damage, potential or actual, 
must be very serious for the applicant. Thirdly, 
there must be clear evidence that the defendants 
have in their possession incriminating documents or 
things, and that there is a real possibility that 
they may destroy such material before any applica-
tion inter partes can be made. 
The requirement that there is an extremely strong prim a J acie 
case imposes a more stringent test on applicants for Anton Piller 
orders than for applicants for conventional interlocutory injunc-
tions which are made inter partes. This is totally appropriate 
considering that many Anton Piller orders are granted before 
statements of claim are filed or even drafted. If there was no 
strict threshold test for granting relief then Anton Piller orders 
could easily become 'fishing' operations. Therefore, it is es en-
tial that applicants for Anton Piller orders must advance as much 
evidence as possible to support their claim and that once the order 
is executed they proceed promptly with the filing of a statement of 
claim.
57 
56Above n4, 62. See also Lord Denning MR at 61. 
57 H yt ra c Conveyors Ltd v Conveyors International Ltd [1983] 1 
WLR 44, 47 per Lawton LJ. 
19 
However, in A B v CD £
58 Lord Hooson QC discharged an Ant on 
Piller order made by McNeil J against the third defendants because 
there was no cause of action at all against them. They had been 
included in the order at the 'instigation'
59 of McNeil J solely 
because they were the employers of the first defendant. Apart from 
being outside the power of the court,6° there cannot have been 'an 
extremely strong prima facie case.' 
The second requirement is similar to the assessment of the 
balance of convenience required for all interlocutory injunctions. 
However, in the case of many applications for an Anton Piller order 
the damage which the plaintiff is likely to suffer from the actions 
of the particular defendant is minimal. In fact, this is one of 
the reasons which led to the development of the Anton Piller order 
in the first place.
61 Therefore, if this requirement does relate 
solely to the individual defendant it must be a very low test or 
else it would very rarely be satisfied.
62 
In none of these cases, however, nor in any other 
case, have I been able to find it suggested that the 
jurisdiction for making an Anton Piller order should 
be in some way dependent upon the operation being of 
58 [1982] RPC 509. 
59 Above n58. 
60See Gouriet v Union of Post Off ice Workers [1978] AC 435. 
61 Above 1-2. 
62 T went i et h Century Fox Film Corporation v Co lo n i al Arms Ta v er n 
(1985) 1 NZIPR 602,608 per Quilliam J. 
20 
any particular magnitude. What is required is that 
the evidence should be strong and should indicate 
the likelihood of substantial loss to the plaintiff. 
However, in such cases the court probably considers the damage 
the plaintiff may suffer from the actions of the defendant and all 
the others acting in a similar fashion. This was indeed mentioned 
as a factor by Graham Jin V apormat i c Co Ltd v S parex Ltd.
63 
However, if this is to be a consideration when granting such a 
Draconian order against a defendant there must be some evidence 
connecting him or her to the massive paten tial damage, i e evidence 
showing the defendant is part of an organisation or network 
designed to infringe copyright. There is little indication that 
such evidence is provided in these cases and certainly no indica-
tions from the courts what level of evidence i required. 
A further element in assessing the balance of convenience 
between the two parties is the assessmenl of the amount of harm the 
defendant might suffer through the execution of the Anton Piller 
order. Lord Denning MR in Anton Piller gave as a prerequisite to 
the granting of relief that ' ... the inspection would do no real 
harm to the defendant or his case.'
64 However, this element was 
63 [1976] 1 WLR 939,941. 
64Above 114, 61. 
21 
largely neglected afterwards and the severe consequences for the 
defendant overlooked. In Columbia Picture Industries Inc v Robin-
son Scott J said: 65 
But a decision whether or not an Anton Piller order 
should be granted requires a balance to be struck 
between the plaintiff's need that the remedies 
allowed by the civil law for the breach of his 
rights should be attainable and the requirement of 
justice that a defendant should not be deprived of 
his property without being heard. What I have heard 
in the present case has disposed me to think that 
the practice of the court has allowed the balance to 
swing much too far in favour of plain tiffs and that 
Anton Piller orders have been too readily granted 
and with insufficient safeguards for respondents. 
The amount of evidence required to show that the defendant may 
destroy the evidence in his or her possession has always been 
unclear. In E.M.J. Ltdv Pandit there was clear evidence that the 
defendant had no hesitation in misleading the court.
66 Therefore, 
it was a reasonable inference that he would destroy vital evidence 
if given notice. However, in Anton Piller there is no indication 
from the Court of Appeal what evidence it considered to be 
sufficient to satisfy this requirement. This is an important 
omission considering Brightman J's refusal to grant an order 
because there was not enough evidence that the documents would 
definitely be destroyed. Presumably it was the evidence showing 
the flagrancy of the infringement of the plaintiff's copyright. 
65
[ 1987] Ch 38, 76. 
66Above 5. 
22 
The lack of a clear standard has led to a wayward application 
of this requirement. In Yousif v Sal am a,
61 evidence, necessarily 
undisputed, claiming that the defendant was generally untrust-
worthy, was considered sufficient to grant an Anton Piller order 
even though there was nothing relating directly to the specific 
documents at risk. 
In Universal City Studios Jncv Mukhtar & Sons Ltd,
68 
Templeman J held that proof of bad faith was not an essential 
prerequisite to granting an Anton Piller order. The suspicion that 
the defendants may destroy the infringing copies was sufficient. 
However, this case did not actually concern a 'true' Anton Piller 
order because it did not authorise the entry into the plaintiff's 
property but only ordered the delivery-up of infringing copies. 
Nevertheless, Templeman J's attitude towards Anton Piller orders 
was clear and there is no indication that His Lordship would have 
been any more stringent if the order had authorised entry. 
In Busbyv Thorn EM I Video Programmes Ltd, Cooke J acknowled-
ged this reduced standard :
69 
... there should be evidence to show that the plain-
tiff has reasonable grounds for fearing that evi-
dence will go. The Judge must be entitleu to use 
his common sense and to take into account the usual 
67Above n39. 
68 [1976] 1 WLR 568. 
69Above n20, 467. 
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practices of pirates of copyright and the like. If 
the requirement were put too high the remedy would 
lose much of its value. 
In Twentieth Century Fox Film Corporation v Colonial Arms 
Ta vern, 10 Quilliam J took this further and said that not only was 
direct evidence showing the likelihood of destruction not neces-
sary, but that it would never be available in advance. All that 
was required was sufficient evidence for judges, using their common 
sense, to infer that destruction was likely.
71 
However, recently there have been calls for restraint in both 
the seeking and granting of Anton Piller orders. In Booker 
McConnell pi c v PI asco w Dillon LJ said:
72 
The phrase "a real possibility" [of destruction] is to 
be contrasted with the extravagant fears which seem to 
afflict all plaintiffs who have complaints of breach of 
confidence, breach of copyright or passing off. Where 
the production and delivery up of documents is in 
question, the courts have always proceeded, justi-
fiably, on the basis that the overwhelming majority of 
people in this country will comply with the court's 
order, ... 
... it follows that there is a responsibility in each 
case on the plaintiff's advisers to consider seriously 
whether it is justifiable to seek an Anton Piller order 
against a particular defendant, or whether it would be 
enough to obtain negative injunctions with, if appro-
priate, an order to deliver up documents or material. 
70Above 1162. 
1 1Above 1162, 607. 
72 [1985] RPC 425,441. See also: Jeffrey Rogers Knitwear 
Productions Ltdv Vino/a (Knitwear) Manufacturing Co [1985] 
FSR 184, 189 per Whitford J. 
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Despite these calls for restraint it appears that there 
remains some loose applications of the criteria for granting an 
order.73 In Lock 1 nternational Plc v Beswick1
4 Hoffmann J commen-
ted that: 'Some employers seem to regard competition from former 
employees as presumptive evidence of dishonesty.'
75 His Lordship 
went on to say:
76 
The fact that there is overwhelming evide nee that 
the defendant has behaved wrongfully in his commer-
cial relationships does not necessarily justify an 
Anton Piller order. People whose commercial mora-
lity allows them to take a list of the customers 
with whom they were in contact while employed will 
not necessarily disobey an order of the court 
requiring them to deliver it up. Not everyone who 
is misusing confidential information will destroy 
documents in the face of a court order requiring him 
to preserve them. 
It is submitted that applicants for Anton Piller orders should 
be required to show that, as well as a prim a J acie case, there is 
evidence of mala Jides on the defendant's behalf towards the 
subject matter of the order itself not just toward~ the plaintiff. 
There should also be a return to the underlying basis of the Anton 
73 See K ell y Tar It o n 's Under w a t er W or Id Lt d v M ells op ( 1 9 8 8) 
unrep, CP2024/88 Auckland. 
74
[ 1989] 1 WLR 1268. 
75Above n74, 1281. A similar attitude is taken of video 
pirates. 
76Above n74, 1281. 
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Piller order, which is that the plaintiff is suffering considerable 
damage from the defendant 's activities and will be left effectively 
remediless if the order is not granted.
77 
The power should not be exercised in interlocutory 
proceedings, and certainly not ex parte, unless the 
court is reasonably satisfied that the plaintiff 
will, or probably will, suffer irreparable damage if 
there is any delay in ordering discovery. 
77 Sega Enterprises Ltdv Alea Electroni cs [1982] FSR 516,525 
per Templeman LJ. 
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THE PROBLEM OF SELF-INCRIMINATION 
As well as threatening defendants' rights to privacy etc Anton 
Piller orders also threatened other rights. By being forced to 
disclose the names and addresses of suppliers and customers, 
defendants may be providing evidence against themselves which could 
be used for a criminal prosecution, in particular for infringement 
of the Copyright Act,78 and for conspiracy to defraud.
79 This is 
contrary to the common law principle that no person can be forced 
to disclose information which may make them liable to punishment.
80 
This issue was considered by the House of Lords in Rank Film 
Distributors Ltdv Video Information Centre.
81 Their Lordships 
applied the test for invoking the privilege against self-incrimina-
tion given by Lord Denning MR in Re Westinghouse Uranium 
Contract :82 
[The testimony] may only be one link in the chain, 
or only corrobative of existing material, but still 
he is not bound to answer if he believes on 
reasonable grounds that it could be used against 
him. It is not necessary for him to show that 
78In New Zealand, s28 of the Copyright Act 1962. In England, 
s21 of the Copyright Act 1956. 
79In New Zealand s257 of the Crimes Act 1961 and in England 
under the common law. 
80 Reg v Ga r b e tt ( 18 4 7) 2 Car & K i r 4 7 4; Triplex S a J e t y Glass Co 
Ltdv Lancegaye Safety Glass ( 1934) Ltd [1939] 2 KB 395,403 
per du Parcq LJ. 
81Above 1125 .. 
82 Rio Tinto Zinc Corporationv Westinghouse Electric Corporation 
[1978] AC 547,574. 
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proceedings are likely to be taken against him, or 
would probably be taken against him. It may be 
improbable that they will be taken, but neverthe-
less, if there is some risk of their being taken - a 
real and appreciable risk - as distinct from a 
remote or insubstantial risk, then he should not be 
made to answer or to disclose the documents. 
Lord Wilberforce when applying this test considered the 
practical risk of criminal proceedings being brought. His Lordship 
held 83 that as the last prosecution under the Copyright Act was in 
1913, the risk of prosecution was so small and the penalty so 
slight that the privilege could not be invoked. 
However, the risk of prosecution for conspiracy to defraud was 
considered substantial enough to allow the defendants to invoke the 
privilege against self-incrimination.
84 As one of the defendants 
was actually being prosecuted for this offence, no other conclusion 
could be reached. 85 Also, the much heavier penalties meant that 
conspiracy was a much more serious offence than copyright infringe-
ment. Therefore, the Anton Piller order was varied to omit the 
disclosure requirements. 
This was a severe blow to copyright holders as it was this 
aspect of the Anton Piller order that had proved most useful. The 
83Above 1125, 441. 
84Above n25, 441 per Lord Wilberforce, 445-446 per Lord Fraser 
of Tullybelton. 
85He was convicted and fined £750 with £2000 costs. The annual 
losses to the plaintiffs in Rank were estimated at £500 
million. 
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effect of the case in England was reduced by the passing of section 
72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. This section prohibits the use 
of the privilege against self-discrimination in intellectual pro-
perty cases. However, any evidence given in these cases cannot be 
used against the parties in any prosecution for a 'related 
offence'. 
In New Zealand this issue was settled by the Court of Appeal 
in Busby v Thorn EM I Video Programmes Ltd.86 The majority of the 
court87 avoided the problem of self-incrimination by both altering 
the law of evidence, and by requiring further undertakings from the 
plaintiff: 88 
First, the Court can hold, as a general rule 
regarding criminal evidence, that the documents and 
information will not be admissible against such a 
defendant in any criminal proceedings for an offence 
relating to the intellectual property or other 
subject-matter of the action in which the order has 
been made .. . 
Secondly, ... the plaintiffs here should now be requi-
red to undertake that (except for the purposes of 
proceedings for perjury or contempt of Court) they 
will not, either directly or indirectly, use any 
document which is a subject of the order or any 
information obtained from it or from any answers by 
the defendant under the order for the purpose of any 
criminal prosecution of the defendant, nor make the 
same available to the police for any purpose. 
86Above 1120. Criticised: J Maxton "Anton Piller Orders" [1985] 
NZLJ 307, 316. 
87Cooke and Bisson JJ; Somers J dissenting. 
88Above n20, 474 per Cooke J; see also 487-488 per Bisson J. 
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Somers J dissented on the ground that such changes should be made 
by Parliament rather than the courts.
89 
This solution actually goes further than the English legisla-
tion in that it applies to all Anton Piller orders whenever they 
are granted, whereas section 72 of the Supreme Court Act 1981 only 
applies to intellectual property cases. Therefore, in England the 
privilege against self-incrimination still applies to Anton Piller 
orders granted in cases other than intellectual property cases. 
89Above n20, 482. 
30 
THE FORM OF THE ORDER 
Orders for the Plaintiff 
The full Anton Piller order achieves for the plaintiff: 
-An injunction against dealing in infringing goods; 
-An injunction preventing the destruction or disposal of 
certain goods or documents; 
-Search and seizure orders requiring the defendants to permit 
the plaintiff to enter their premises for named purposes;9° 
-Orders requiring the defendant to disclose specified informa-
• 91 t10n; 
-Orders requiring the defendant not to disclose the existence 
of the order to certain persons. 
Considering the extreme nature of these orders it is obviously 
desirable that they are' ... drawn as to extend no further than the 
minimum extent necessary to achieve the purpose for which they are 
granted' .92 The evidence which the plaintiff is authorised to 
seize or inspect should be defined as tightly as possible to 
90Typically: the inspection of articles and documents; the 
photographing and photocopying of articles and documents, or 
their removal into safe custody. 
91 Usually the names of suppliers. 
92Above n65, 76. See also: CBS United Kingdom Ltdv Lambert 
[19831 Ch 37, 44 per Lawton LJ. 
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prevent the execution of the Anton Piller order becoming a general 
search through the defendant's entire property and also to prevent 
it becoming a 'fishing' operation. There ~hould be as much 
emphasis as possible on in~pection and copying of evidence rather 
than its seizure. This is to prevent the defendant being deprived 
of his or her own property for any longer than is absolutely 
necessary. In particular there appears little need to seize 
relatively large objects such as video recorder . As Scott Jin 
Columbia Pictures said: 'What was the fear? That the defendants 
would destroy them? ' 93 However, obviously items that clearly 
infringe copyright or which belong to the plaintiff can justifiably 
be seized. It is essential that the plaintiffs prepare a detailed 
list of items seized and give this to the defendant prior to 
removing them. 
Unfortunately, most Anton Piller orders are not tightly 
drafted. For instance the Anton Pill er order granted in Busby v 
Thorn EM 1 V ideu Progrummes Ltd,94 and approved by the Court of 
Appeal, permitted the plaintiffs to search for and possibly seize 
'illicit goods'. These included :95 
Any complete or substantial copy ... of any cinema-
tograph film as defined in the Copyright Act 1962, 
93Above n65, 58. 
94Above n20. 
95Above n20, 475. Also included were labels etc for any video 
cassettes and video recorders etc. 
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and it being fewer than 50 years old, the copyright 
in which film is vested in, or exclusively licensed 
to, the plaintiffs ... 
This definition does not exclude authorised copie~ of these films 
which could therefore be seized with infringing copies even though 
they could not be the subject matter of or evidence for any cause 
of action. This was recognised by the Court of Appeal but was 
considered of 'little importance'.96 As the defendants were all 
owners of video clubs, their entire stock could be seized. The 
order also permitted the plaintiffs to seize 'invoices, bills, 
books of account, cheques and butts, or other documents that relate 
to illicit goods.' 97 As the sole purpose of the video clubs was to 
rent out copies of films which would be defined as 'illicit goods', 
their entire business records could be seized as well. 
The problem of widely drawn Anton Piller orders is exacerbated 
by the fact that it is plaintiffs, or their solicitors, which 
usually decide what items shall be seized under the order. 
Naturally, their inclination is to give the order its widest 
possible meaning and to seize anything which might be remotely 
related to it. It is also apparent that many plaintiffs and 
solicitors go beyond the terms of the order.
98 
96Above n20, 464 per Cooke J. 
97Above 1120, 475. 
98Above 1165, 62-63. See also A B v CD E above n58, 510. 
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... the practice of the firm [is to take] not simply 
documents and things which could be seen to be 
covered by the order but to take also documents or 
things which further and subsequent investigation 
might, but might not, prove to be covered by the 
order, ... I have no hesitation in saying that If ind 
this practice an objectionable one. 
In Columbia Pictures the solicitors went further and obtained the 
defendant's signature signifying that the articles were given up 
pursuant to the Anton Piller order 'or otherwise by consent.' 
Scott J found this practice ' ... wholly unacceptable'99 and held 
that such consent was of no effect as it could not be considered as 
given freely in the circumstances of an Anton Piller 'raid'. 
Safeguards for the 'Victim' 
The granting of such sweeping orders, especially when they are 
granted ex parte, naturally means that there must be safeguards to 
protect those upon whom the orders are served. Some of these are 
common to all interlocutory injunctions, while some are unique to 
Anton Piller orders. In Booker McConnell pie v Plasco w, Dillon LJ 
considered these undertakings should be contained in every Anton 
Piller order: 100 
-An undertaking by the plaintiff that when the order is served 
on the defendants, they will also be given the evidence that 
supported the application for the order; 
99Above n65, 77. 
100Above n72, 442; see also A B v CD E above n58, 510. 
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-An undertaking to explain to the defend ants the terms of the 
order being served and to advise them to seek immediate legal 
advice; 
-Express liberty to the defendant to apply on short notice to 
the court to discharge or vary the order; 
-An undertaking as to damages by the plaintiff; 101 
-An undertaking to commence proceedings if this has not 
already occurred. 
Other undertakings included in most Anton Piller orders are: 
-An undertaking that any documents or material seized will be 
held in good custody by the plaintiff and will not be used 
for proceedings other than the current one; 102 
-An undertaking that any information obtained will not be useu 
for any criminal prosecution or made available to the 
l . 103 po ice. 
Obviously the most important of these unuertakings to the 
defendant is the undertaking as to damages. However, there are 
101
The court must be satisfied the plaintiff is good for this 
undertaking: Vapormatic Co Ltd v Sparex Ltd above n63. 
102
This undertaking may be varied with the court's leave in 
special circumstances: Crest Homes Pie v Marks [1987) AC 829; 
Soft-Tech international Pty Ltdv Ball (1990) unrep, CP2788/89 
Auckland. 
103
This is necessary to avoid the problem of self-incrimination. 
See above 27-30. 
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several problems with this undertaking. First, it is an underta-
king to the court not to the defendant. Any damages payable under 
it are entirely at the court's dbcretion.
104 Secondly, the 
undertaking is generally not enforceable until the substantive 
trial. Due to the expense of litigation and the crippling effects 
of the Anton Piller order itself, such enforcement is rare. 105 
I do not regard the right to apply to discharge the 
order as sufficient protection for the defendants. The 
trauma of the execution of the Anton Piller order means 
that in practice it is often difficult to exercise 
until after substantial damage has been done. 
The rarity of the enforcement of the plaintiff's undertaking may 
also be due to the fact that the defendant will only be compensated 
for damage to his or her legitimate business plus aggravated, and 
arguably exemplary, damages. Often this will not be very great.
106 
The defend ant also has the procedural protections granted to 
every defendant to an ex part emotion. These are that the 
plaintiff must act with the utmost good faith to the court and, in 
particular, must make full disclosure of all the material facts. 
104Digital Equipment Corporation v Darkcrest Ltd [1984] Ch 512 
105 Lock J nternational Pie v Beswick above 1174, 1283 per Hoffmann 
J. 
106However, see Columbia Pictures above n65, where the 
defendant was granted £10,000, but this was for quite outrageous 
conduct by the plaintiff and was probably only a fraction of 
his actual loss. He ultimately had to pay £27,242.50 damages 
to the plaintiffs: [1988] FSR 531. 
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THE REQUIREMENT FOR FULL DISCLOSURE 
Probably the most effective safeguard for defendants is the 
duty of every applicant for an ex parte order to make ' ... the 
fullest possible disclosure of all material facts within his 
knowledge'.
107 
This duty to disclose extends to material facts 
which the applicant would have known about if proper inquiries had 
been made.
108 
It is this duty to disclose all material facts, 
including any potential defences that may be available, which is 
meant to overcome, as much as possible, the lack of any argument 
from the defendant in ex pa rte applications. The danger of one-
sided argument can be seen in Kelly Tar/ton's Underwater World Ltd 
v M ellsop where Robertson J discharged an Anton Piller order he had 
d · 109 ma e sayrng: 
As I say, whether rightly or wrongly, I was left 
with the impression that suddenly the Plaintiffs had 
become aware, much to their surprise, that this man 
Mellsop who they thought had left knowing that he 
had no rights to the 'know-how' was now surrupti-
ciously [sic] using them. The evidence in its 
totality leaves me with the clear impression that 
there has been an on-going internicine [sic] war 
between these people. Some very long time after the 
event, the Plaintiffs have decided they wish to 
challenge the arrangements in the Courts. In my 
view they must take their chances in the litigation 
like every other litigant. 
101 Rexv Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, Exparte Princess 
Edmond de Po!ignac [1917] 1 KB 486,509 per Warrington LJ. 
108Bank Mell at v N ikpour [1985] FSR 87. 
JOQ b 7 A oven 3, 14-15. 
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To deter this behaviour by plaintiffs, courts had enforced 
this duty very strictly. If there was any material non-disclosure 
then the Anton Piller order would automatically be discharged 
regardless of its merits even if evidence obtained through its 
execution shows that the order was justified.
110 However, this 
severity has now relaxed and the position is now that: 111 
If such disclosure is not made by the plaintiff, the 
court may discharge the ex parte injunction on that 
ground alone. But if, in the circumstances existing 
when the matter comes before the court inter partes, 
justice requires an order either continuing the ex 
parte injunction or the grant of a fresh injunction, 
such an order can be made notwithstanding the 
earlier failure of the plaintiff to make such 
disclosure. 
The ref ore, defendants no longer have an automatic right to dis-
charge if there has been material non-disclosure. Material non-
disclosure is reduced to a potential ground on which the court may, 
in its discretion, decide to discharge the order or injunction. 
This discretion will only be exercised in favour of continuing the 
order, or granting a second order in similar terms, if the non-
110Thermaxv Schott Industrial Glass Ltd (1981] FSR 289, Browne-
Wilkinson J. 
11 1Dormeuil Freres S Av Nicolian International (Textiles) Ltd 
(1988] 1 WLR 1362, 1368 per Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C. 
See also: Brink's M ut Ltd v El comb e [1988] 1 WLR 1350, 1357 
per Ralph Gibson LJ; Lloyds Bo wmaker Ltd v Britannia Arra w 
Holdings Pie (1988] 1 WLR 1337, 1343-1344 per Glidewell LJ. 
Applied in Euro-National Corporation Ltdv Petricevic 
Financial Services Ltd (1989) unrep, CP 1205/89Auckland. 
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disclosure is innocent and if the order could properly have been 
granted if full disclosure had been made at the original ex parte 
l • 112 1ear1ng. 
However, in Behebehani v Salem , Woolf LJ held that generally 
courts should uphold the policy of discharging ex pa rt e orders even 
for innocent non-disclosure. 113 Therefore, at least in England, 
the plaintiff must also show why the public policy behind the 
requirement for full disclosure should be ignored in thi s particu-
lar case. Unfortunately, it is unlikely that thb approach would 
also be followed in New Zealand. New Zealand courts treat reviews 
of interlocutory injunctions, under Rule 264 of the High Court 
Rules, as hearings de no vo 
11 4 
which seems to exclude any similar 
policy considerations being taken into account. The judge should 
only consider whether the order should have been made on the basis 
of all the evidence that is now disclosed and with the benefit of 
argument from both sides. 115 
Exactly what constitutes material non-di sclosure is obviou sly 
incapable of definition as it will depend on the circum stances of 
112Lloyds Bo wmaker Ltd v Britannia Arrow Holdings Pie above nll 1, 
1244 per Glidewell LJ; Ali and Fahd Shobokshi Group Ltdv 
M oneim [1989] 1 WLR 710, 720 per Mervyn Davies J. 
113 (1989] 1 WLR 723, 734-735. 
11 4 Carter Holt Holdings Ltdv Fletcher Holdings Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 
80, 84 per Mahon J. 
11 5D B Baverstock Ltd v Ha y cock [1986] 1 NZLR 342, 344 per Henry 
J. 
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each case. The most common material non-disclosure is not giving a 
proper indication of the nature of the defendant's business, for 
example its size or extent. 116 The matter must go towards the very 
essence of the Anton Pill er order itself. Material non-disclosure 
does not occur merely because the plaintiff could have set out 
something more fully. For instance: a failure to mention a 
mortgage on a property put forward to meet a cross-undertaking as 
to damages, when there is still considerable equity in the 
• • l 117 property, 1s not matena . 
Furthermore, in Brink ' s Mat Ltd v Elcombe, Slade LJ recommen-
ded a more relaxed attitude to this duty in commercial cases, which 
includes almost all Anton Piller cases. 118 
Particularly, in heavy commercial cases, the border-
line between material facts and non-material facts 
may be a somewhat uncertain one. While in no way 
discounting the heavy duty of candour and care which 
falls on persons making ex parte applications, I do 
not think the application of the principle should be 
carried to extreme lengths ... .I have suspected 
signs of a growing tendency on the part of some 
litigants ... [to allege] material non-disclosure on 
116See Columbia Pictures above n65; Kelly Tarlton's Underwater 
World above n73; J ef J rey Rogers Knit wear Productions above 
1172. 
11 1 Gallery Cosmetics Ltdv Number 1 [1981) FSR 556. See also 
Anvil Jewellery Ltd v Riva Ridge Holdings Ltd [1987] 1 NZLR 
35. 
118 b 9 Aovenlll,135. 
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sometimes rather slender grounds, as representing 
substantially the only hope of obtaining the dis-
charge of injunctions in cases where there is little 
hope of doing so on the substantial merits of the 
case ... 
However, in the context of Anton Piller orJers, as well as 
M areva injunctions , it is submitted that the better approach is 
that advocated by Scott Jin Columbia Pictures that applicants 
' ... ought to err on the side of excessive disclosure'
11 9 
and that 
judges not the plaintiff ' s advisers should decide what is material 
and what is not. Only by this method will this already imperfect 
safeguard remain any safeguard at all. 
11 9 Above n65, 77. 
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THE EXECUTION OF ANT ON P 1 LLER ORDERS 
It is constantly stressed that the plaintiff must be meticu-
lous when executing the order and that they remain within its terms 
and that they act 'with due circumspection.'
120 They must satisfy 
all of their undertakings to give information to the defendant when 
executing the order
121 and to ensure that only the articles 
specified in the order are seized. If the plaintiff departs from 
the order's terms then there will be 'firm enforcement '
122 of their 
undertaking to damages. As most Anton Piller orders specify the 
number of people who may enter the defendant ' s property, anyone 
exceeding this number will be committing a trespass.
123 
A defendant faced by an Anton Piller order has the choice of 
complying with the order or being in contempt of court. Even if 
the defendant subsequently discharges the order, it is still a 
valid court order until it is discharged and the defendant is still 
bound to obey it before then.
124 Although the likelihood of any 
penalty being imposed in these circumstances is negligible ,
125 
120Above 4, 61 per Lord Denning MR; see also 62 per Ormrod LJ. 
121A B v CD E above n58. 
122Above n20, 467. 
123However, this must be the subject of a seperate action brought 
by the defendant: Fletcher Sutcliffe Wild Ltdv Burch [1982] 
FSR 64, Peter Gibson J. 
124Wardle Fabrics Ltdv G Myristis Ltd [1984] FSR 263,271 per 
Goulding J. 
125 Hall mark Cards Inc v 1 mage Arts Ltd [1977] FSR 150, 153 per 
Buckley LJ. 
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defendants who apply to discharge an Anton Piller order without 
first complying with it:
126 
... do so very much at their peril. If they succeed 
in getting the order discharged, all well and good. 
But if they fail, they will render themselves liable 
to penalties for contempt of court. If they fail 
and there is any reason to believe that, in the 
period between the time when the order has been 
served on them and the time when they eventually 
comply with the order, they had taken any steps 
which were inconsistent with the order ... the conse-
quences to them would be of the utmost gravity. 
Furthermore, non-compliance may lead to adverse inferences bein
g 
drawn against the defendant at the sub tantive trial. 
Therefore, the defendant is more or less obliged to comply 
with the Anton Piller order. However, this will be cause consider-
able disturbance and expense to a business, even if it is entirely 
legitimate. If the plaintiff is particularly unscrupulous, and the 
Anton Piller order drawn fairly wide, this disruption may be 
increased to such an extent that the defendant will be left with no 
trading stock and no business records. Regardless of whether the 
defendant is infringing or not he or she will quickly go out of 
business and the merits of the substantive ca~e will never be 
heard. 
There is no doubt that abuses of the Anton Piller procedure do 
126 W EA Records Lt<i v Visions Channel 4 Lt<i [1983] 1 WLR 721, 726
 
per Sir John Donaldson MR. 
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occur when the order is being executed. In!. T. C. Film Distribu-
tors Ltd v Video Exchange Lti21 the plaintiffs' solicitor executed 
an Anton Piller order al the same time as eleven police officers 
were executing a search warrant. The def endanl was given no 
opportunity to deny the solicitor entry. The Court of Appeal held 
that such an opportunity had to be given at street-door level when 
executing Anton Piller orders. 
Such abuses of Anton Piller orders lead lo inevitable compari-
sons with the search warrants declared illegal in Entick v 
Carrington. 128 In that case Lord Camden CJ considered four main 
dangers were raised by general warrants: 
-They act against a general class against whom no charge has 
been proven; 
-They do not specify what property may be seized; 
-The defendant does not have an opportunity to be heard before 
they are executed; 
-They can be executed in the defendant's absence so there may 
be no witnesses of what occurs or of what is taken. 
Anton Piller orders act against a very specific class of defendants 
after a hearing before a High Court judge where some evidence of 
121 The Times, 18 November 1981; The Times, 17 June 1982, CA. 
Noted: (1982) 126 Sol J 672. See L Collins "Anton Piller 
Orders and Fundamental Rights" ( 1990) 106 LOR 173. 
128Above n26. 
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wrongdoing must be presented. They do specify what property can be 
inspected and seized although this is often in quite broad terms. 
In theory, the defendant does have an opportunity lo be heard 
because he or she can apply for an immediate discharge before 
complying with the order. However, in practice this right is 
somewhat illusory. Finally, Anton Piller orders cannot be executed 
in the absence of the defendant because their permission i::i 
required before the plaintiff may enter. Therefore, there will 
always be witnesses lo an Anton Piller search. 
Therefore, while the execution of Anton Piller orders still 
arouses some concerns, il does not raise the ::iame dangers as the 
general search warrants, with the exception of the lack of a 
hearing for the defendant. This is an inherent danger in all ex 
pa rte injunctions; hence the procedural requirements for full 
disclosure and uberrimafides. This makes the current lowering of 
the standard required of ex parte applicants even more concerning. 
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DISCHARGE OF ANT ON PILLER ORDERS 
Although the defendant has the right to appeal the actual 
decision to grant the Anton Piller order,
129 the proper course to 
follow is to apply for its review and subsequent discharge or 
variation. 130 Anton Piller orders may be discharged both before 
and after execution. For reasons already discussed, they are 
generally always complied with so applications are usually for 
discharge after execution.
13 1 An Anton Piller order will be 
discharged if the defendant can show that it should never have been 
made. 13
2 In deciding this, the court may consider evidence 
gathered when the order was executed.
133 In Anvil Jewellery Ltd v 
Riva Ridge Holdings Ltd Henry J held there were three grounds on 
which a defendant could obtain a discharge of an executed Anton 
Piller order: 134 
129Under the Judicature Act 1908 s66 the Court of Appeal may hear 
appeals from any order granted by the High Court. 
130WEA Records Ltdv Visions Channel 4 Ltd above 11126, 727 per 
Sir John Donaldson MR; applied in Kiwi Co-operative Dairies 
Ltdv Capital Dairy Products Ltd (1989) 1 PRNZ 622, 627 per 
Grieg J. 
131Above 42-43. 
132Booker McConnell pie v Plascow above n72, 434 per Kerr LJ, 442 
P.er Dillon LJ. 
13 Above 11126, 727-728 per Sir John Donaldson MR; followed in DB 
Baver stock Ltd v Haycock above n 115. For a contrary view see 
Guess? Incv Lee Seek Mon (1986) 7 IPR 321. 
134Above 11117, 43. 
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-Bad faith; 
-Material non-disclosure; 
-Special circumstances showing a need for immediate relief. 
Henry J also mentioned a fourth potential ground of abuse of 
process. However, His Honour suggests that this is implicit in the 
other three. 
The special circumstance required to justify an immediate 
discharge usually refers to cases where the defendant continues to 
suffer ongoing damage due to the execution of the Anton Piller 
order. This may be through the retention of crucial business 
documents by the plaintiff, where the defendant's business is 
completely ruined by the execution of the order
135 
or where the two 
parties are in direct competition with each other and the Anton 
Piller order is being used to discredit the defendant. In Booker 
McConnell pie v Plasco w 136 an executed Anton Piller order was 
discharged against the second and third defendants who were 
employers of the first defendant. They were both public companies 
and there was no indication that they would not comply with normal 
discovery procedure. Furthermore, the execution of the Anton 
Piller order had been publicised in a trade magazine and they had 
135As in Columbia Pictures above 1165. 
136Above n72. 
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both suffered some loss of reputation because of this. This loss 
of reputation was sufficiently damaging in the interim to justify 
an immediate discharge.
137 
However, if the only reason for the application for discharge 
b to enforce the undertaking as to damages then there will be no 
discharge. The matter will be left until the substantive trial.
138 
In Dormeuil Freres SAv Nicolian International (Textiles) Ltd,
139 
Sir Nicolas Browne-Wilkinson V-C held almost all applications to 
discharge were to enforce the undertaking to damages. Except in 
exceptional cases, Sir Nicolas considered it incorrect to apply to 
discharge an executed Anton Piller order before the substantive 
trial because ' setting aside the Anton Piller order cannot undo 
what has already been done.' 140 Therefore, to set aside any 
executed Anton Piller order it is neces!:>ary lo show special 
circu ms Lances. 
If the Anton Piller order is discharged then the defendant may 
be able to enforce immediately the plaintiff' s undertaking to 
damages. 141 The plaintiff may also have to return some or all of 
the documents he or she has seized although thb is unlikely to 
137Above 1172, 435 per Kerr LJ. See also: Fields ( Randolph M) v 
Watts, The Times, 22 November 1984, (CA); Luck 1 nternational 
Plc v Berwick above 1174. 
138 Booker McConnell above n72, 435 per Kerr LJ. 
139 Above n 111. 
140Above nlll, 1369. 
141See Lo ck I nternatiunal above 1174, 1285 per Hoffmann J. 
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affect the admissibility of any of the evidence in the substantive 
trial. Even if the Anton Pill er order was wrongly made, evidence 
gained through its execution is still admissible.
142 
Assuming for the moment that the full order ought 
not to have been maue in the first place in 1977, 
nevertheless it has been implemented. The evidence 
is available in the hands of the plaintiff for them 
to give in evidence. I do not think that the judge 
has any discretion to refuse to admit it in 
evidence. 
Although this was not followed by Falconer Jin Universal City 
Studios Incv Hubbard,
143 on appeal the Court of Appeal had 
'serious doubt' over whether His Lordship's opinion was correct, 
although the decision was upheld on other grounds.
144 
The ref ore, once an Anton Piller order is execu Led the re is 
little a defendant can do unless he or she can show some special 
circumstances such as continuing damage to his or her reputation. 
If special circumstances can be shown then the plaintiff may be 
awarded some damages, although these are entirely discretionary, 
and, more importantly, will probably be awarded costs. Property 
seized pursuant to the order may be returned but the plaintiff will 
retain copies of it and it will probably remain admissible in any 
142 H elliwell v Piggott-Sim s [1980] FSR 356 per Lord Denning MR. 
143 (1983] Ch 241; followed in DB Baverstock Ltd v Haycock above 
11115. 
144 (1984] Ch 225, 236-237. 
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substantive trial. The difficulty in showing special circumst
an-
ces, combined with the severe economic consequences of be
ing served 
with an Anton Piller order and the expense of taking the legal
 
action necessary to discharge mainly explains why the vast m
ajority 
of Anton Piller orders are never challenged at an inter parte
s 
hearing. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR REFORM 
There are obviously many problems with the Anton Piller order 
as it presently exists. These problems include: 
-The problem inherent with any order made ex parte that 
unmerited orders will occasionally be made because of the 
absence of argument from the defendant. This is exacerbated 
by the imprecise criteria for granting an Anton Piller order 
and their inconsistent application. 
-Abuse of the Anton Piller procedure by plaintiffs seeking 
Anton Piller orders in circumstances where they are not 
justified and going beyond their terms when executing them. 
Again this problem is made worse by the unnecessarily wide 
terms of many orders. 
-The inability of defendants, in normal circumstances, to 
obtain any remedy for abuse of the Anton Piller oruer by 
plaintiffs until the substantive trial. As the effect of the 
order itself and the cost of litigation mean~ that ubstan-
tive trials rarely occur it is now the defendant who b left 
effectively remediless. 
These problems make reform of the current Anton Piller 
procedure essential. This reform woulu preferably be made by 
Parliament. The main objection to the Anton Piller order, and the 
51 
general warrants before them, is that it involves legislation by 
judges. In Busby v Thorn EM IV idea Programmes Ltd Somers J warned 
' ... we must not pass beyond that which is truly adjudicatory to 
that which is truly truly legislative'
145 and in Entick v Carring-
ton Lord Camden CJ said:
146 
What would the parliament say, if the judges should 
take upon themselves to mould an unlawful power into 
a convenient authority, by new restrictions? That 
would be, not judgment, but legislation. 
Legislative reform would remove this objection as well as 
remove any remaining doubts about their constitutional position as 
' ... a search warrant in disguise.'
147 However, as Anton Piller 
orders are a judicial creation much reform can also be undertaken 
unilaterally by the courts especially through the drafting of the 
orders. 
Currently, too much is expected of the plaintiff's solicitors. 
They owe a duty to their clients to act in their interests, but are 
expected to fully disclose all material information to the court 
and to act as an officer of the court to ensure the order is 
properly executed. These responsibilities obviously conflict. It 
cannot be expected that this conflict can be resolved satisfactor-
145Above n20, 482. 
146Above n26, 1067. 
147Above 114, 60 per Lord Denning MR. See above 11-13. 
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ily. An impartial official presence when the Anton Piller order is 
executed would relieve the solicitor of having to act as an officer 
of the court. A person acting solely as an officer of the court, 
such as the sheriff, should be present when the order is executed. 
This person could ensure that the terms of the order are strictly 
adhered to and the defendant's rights respected. Alternatively, 
the sheriff could conduct the en tire execution of the order him or 
herself. 148 
The Anton Piller orders themselves should be drafted and 
executed in such a manner as to cause the minimum disruption to the 
defendant's legitimate business, if any. The order should specify 
as precisely as possible what material may be seized. Above all 
they should not allow material to be seized that cannot be the 
subject matter of the action or be relevant evidence. Material 
should not be withheld from the defendants for longer than is 
necessary. Material seized should be copied or photographed 
promptly and then returned to the defendants, with an undertaking 
that they will preserve the evidence until the substantive 
trial. 149 Preferably, seized materials should be placed in the 
custody of a third party, such as the sheriff, who can control 
148This was the case in Donselaar v Mosen above n16. This would 
be ::,imilar to the way the Registrar of the High Court conducts 
mortgagee sales: Property Law Act 1952, s99. 
149See LT Piver SARL v S & J Perfume Co Ltd [1987] FSR 159, 160 
per Walton J. 
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access to them to ensure any confidential information remains 
confidential. 
Further safeguards for the defendants are also desirable. 
They should be able to generally enforce the plaintiff's undertak-
ing to damages before the substantive trial. It should not be 
necessary to show special circumstances. Similarly, the recent 
relaxation in the courts' attitudes to material non-disclosure 
should not be taken any further. Plaintiffs should be required to 
positively show why the policy behind the requirement of full 
disclosure should not apply to them and courts should insist on a 
very strong case before waiving this requirement. It should also 
be made clear that plaintiffs who do not fully disclose are very 
l 'k d' I~ muc 1 at ns regar 111g costs. 
Finally, the Anton Piller order arose from the inadequacy of 
the copyright law to protect copyright holders from piracy. It has 
been very successful in reducing the activities of pirates and 
providing copyright holders with some relief. However, to some 
extent this has proved a Pyrrhic victory because the copyright law 
remains as inadequate today as it was in 1974. Reform of the 
Copyright Act 1962 to address the problem of piracy is still 
necessary but because of the success of the Anton Piller order it 
150See Systematica Ltdv London Computer Centre Ltd [1981] FSR 
313, 316-317 per Whitford J. 
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is now regarded as less urgent. The Anton Piller order is an 
effective anti-piracy measure, but it should only be regarded as a 
stopgap measure. It has some inherent problems, especially the 
risk of its abuse. The United States of America has not felt the 
need to develop something akin to the Anton Piller order even 
though it experienced the same problem of piracy. This ha!:> largely 
been to the effectiveness its statutory provisions.
151 
Similar 
provisions should be enacted in New Zealand which would take some 
of the policing of piracy, especially the elements that involve 
infringing civil liberties, away from the individual copyright 
holders and into the hands of government. 
15 1See RT Mowrey "The Rise and Fall of Record Piracy" (1977) 27 
Copyright Law Symp 155. 
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CONCLUSION 
Anton Piller orders were developed by the courts to give 
justice to an obviously deserving plaintiff who was otherwise 
effectively remediless. They were granted because they were 
necessary to avoid a miscarriage of justice. However, this 
jurisprudential basis does not sit well with their current status 
as a standard remedy ~ought by plaintiffs, typically large corpora-
tions, in certain types of cases, i e cases involving piracy aud 
employees 'defecting' to a competitor or starting their own 
business. Through widely drawn orders and enthusiastic execution 
they have become a useful mean~ for some to abuse their dominant 
position. In Anton Piller Brightman J said:
152 
.. .it seems to me that an order on the lines ~ought 
might become an instrument of oppression, particu-
larly where a plaintiff of big standing and deep 
pocket is ranged against a small man who is alleged 
on the evidence of one side only to have infringed 
the plaintiff's rights. 
Unfortunately, in ~ome respects, Brightman J's concerns have proved 
correct. The fact that generally the large corporations are 
careful in selecting who they obtain Anton Piller orders against is 
no answer to the concerns that they raise.
153 Just because the 
full danger of Ant on Pill er orders has not yet been realised doe~ 
152Above n14, 722. 
153See Columbia Pictures Industries Inc v Robinson above n65, 75 
per Scott J. 
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not make the danger any less. 
The need for reform of the Anton Piller order to prevent the 
realisation of this danger is obvious. However, it is unlikely 
that such reform will come from Parliament,
154 however desirable 
this may be. Therefore, it is likely that any reform must come 
from the courts. The reforms discussed above could be made by the 
courts by changing the terms of the Anton Piller orders that are 
granted. This, together with a more robust approach towards the 
actual granting of Anton Piller orders, should go some way towards 
restoring basic liberties such as the presumption of innocence and 
the sanctity of the home to their former status without destroying 
the genuine worth that Anton Piller orders have in the right 
circumstances. 
154 'The development of the Anton Piller order can be safely left 
to our courts.': Reform of the Copyright Act 1962 (1985) 
Discussion Paper, Justice Department, Wellington, 21. 
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